Identifikasi Risiko atas 'Kebangkrutan Pemda'

Public Service Characteristics & Ethos

Corruption by public servants is not to be tolerated at all costs, as this istantamount to abusing the officer’s position as custodian and steward of public resourcesand public trust.It is critical that Singapore have a clean and effective Public Service:- Committed to the values of meritocracy and freedom from corruption andnepotism

• Judging effectiveness by results achieved through pragmatism and a sense of urgency.
• Continuously driving for efficiency in execution which is responsive andeconomic.
• … “Only by upholding the integrity of the administration can the economy work in a way which enables Singaporeans to clearly see the nexus between hard work and highrewards”

Lee Kuan Yew (1979), then Prime Minister of SingaporeThe test is not minimalist government, but effective government. In Singapore, effectivegovernment (high economic growth, improving welfare and social conditions, internaland external security) is invariably linked with the idea of clean government.

Meritocracy is important not “merely” because it ensures the best use of ourhuman resources. Rather, meritocracy is a key part of our nation building efforts.Meritocracy sends out a signal that Singapore is for everyone. Talent and hard work,rather than connections and privilege, are the paths to success, and thus the rewards ofsuccess would be accessible to anyone according to his contributions. There us no roomfor “free-riders”.

Nepotism, the obverse of meritocracy, is corrosive of trust and confidence in theeffectiveness and impartiality of public institutions, and gnaws away at the sense of publicownership which is so important to national consciousness. It distorts decision making byencouraging favouritism, and drags down efficiency both by putting incompetent peoplein public position, and by sapping the morale of the competent.

Dr Jon Quah (Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A ComparativeAnalysis of their Anti-Corruption Strategies, 1982).

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Reduced Opportunities and Incentives for Corruption –

Administrative Measures to Increase Transparency and Predictability. This principle is straightforward: “Prevention is better than cure”. We ought toremove opportunity for corruption through clear work procedures and decision rules.And we should improve transparency and accountability wherever we can, so the public knows what they can expect, and may complain when they do not get it. Also, have clear rules in the government Instruction Manual on issues likes:

1.  a public officer cannot borrow money from any person who has officialdealings with him,
2.  a public officer cannot use any official information to further his privateinterest,
3.  a public officer is require to declare his assets at his first appointment and alsoannually, and
4.  a public officer cannot receive entertainment or presents in any form frommembers of the public.

Dr Jon Quah (Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A ComparativeAnalysis of their Anti-Corruption Strategies, 1982).

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Changing the Way Government Does Its Business: Streamlining

Operations to Improve Efficiency and Effectiveness. This principle is also straightforward. Seek continuous improvement in public service delivery. There is no rent available for the corrupt officer to collect if effective and efficient services can be available without bribes. Thus fostering excellence in publicservice–slashing red tape, streamlining procedures, minimising delays–is an anticorruption measure in itself. Other measures like name tags, posted fee schedules, QualityCircles (or what we call Work Improvement Teams in Singapore), Suggestions Schemes,help attune public servants towards superior customer service, and make them activists for change and improvement. While not explicitly connected with preventing corruption, the attitudes they foster work against corruption.

Dr Jon Quah (Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A ComparativeAnalysis of their Anti-Corruption Strategies, 1982).

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Enhanced Likelihood of Detection

Institutional Capacity and Bureaucratic Independence of Anti-Corruption Agencies 20 I need say very little on this principle, for you have your ICAC what we have withour Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). Our CPIB reports directly to ourPrime Minister but, under a provision in our Constitution, may yet proceed with itsinvestigations despite any direction from the Prime Minister. Over the years, the CPIB hasbrought corruption charges against a number of senior Government officials, includingministers, members of parliament, civil servants and agency CEOs.

Dr Jon Quah (Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A ComparativeAnalysis of their Anti-Corruption Strategies, 1982)

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Swift and Severe Punishment

The high penalties in our laws deter corruption by making it a “high risk, low profit” undertaking. They deter those who bribe as well as those who receive. Thepenalties go beyond fines and jail sentences. Public shaming through publicity of the caseis an integral part of the punishment, so that the officer not only suffers personally butalso brings disgrace to his family.

“There are several good protections against temptations, but the surest is cowardice.”Mark Twain (“Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New Calendar”,Following the Equator (1897).

Dr Jon Quah (Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A ComparativeAnalysis of their Anti-Corruption Strategies, 1982)

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Strong Public Support

The press plays an active role in publishing examples of corrupt cases involving senior civil servants or politicians, and in providing complete details of the offences and punishment meted out. This both informs the public about the consequences ofcorruption, as well as fosters a climate that is less tolerant of corruption.

There is also strong public support against corruption because of their confidencein the CPIB to deal fairly, thoroughly and confidentially with the complaints they lodgewith the CPIB. The public believes they will receive a fair and impartial hearing, and willbe protected from harassment and retaliation. It is a trust very difficult to regain if lost.This in itself is a check on the CPIB to always act in a way which reinforces, rather thandetracts, from public trust.

I have described the past and the present concerning corruption in the CivilService. Allow me now to turn to the future. The first question must be: What will thefuture be like? As I mentioned early in this address,

• It is a future of a more demanding and critical public, an external environmentmore fluid and less predictable, a world more linked up by InformationTechnology yet more competitive as states drive for talent, investments andmarkets.
• It is a future not only of change, but of change at an increasing pace.
• It is a future of information, but information so voluminous and overwhelmingthat the problem is extracting the most relevant and putting them together in a way which allows good decisions to be made.
• It is a future of opportunity, but opportunity so many and varied that thedifficulty is sorting out what opportunities to pursue and what to leave alone.
• It is a future of market economies, where more than ever before the privatesector must be an engine of growth, yet their capacity to move fast and moveright must depend on a public service which facilitates rather than controls.
• It is a future of uncertainty and unpredictability, yet we must find a way to be intime for such a future.

Dr Jon Quah (Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A ComparativeAnalysis of their Anti-Corruption Strategies, 1982)

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